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Much has been said about the possible influence of fake news on the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, the 2017 French elections or the 2017 German federal
parliamentary election. Countries around the globe are currently pondering ways
to address the phenomenon. A high-level group of experts set up by the European
Commission presented a report on possible policies to counter fake news and
disinformation spread online. France recently passed an anti-fake news law. In many
discussions, the German Network Enforcement Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz)
has been cited as a prototype, though this law merely reinforced existing notice-and-
take-down duties.
The developments and discussions have been followed closely around the world,
including in Southeast Asia, the region with one of the world’s highest diversity in
terms of political and constitutional systems, legal influences, religions, cultures
and languages. Here, diverse countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have recently passed or are
considering the passing of fake news laws, i.e. laws that criminalize the publication
or distribution of false information and/or establish duties to remove impugned
content from the internet.
The “politics of falsehood” is a particularly interesting lens through which deeper
analyses of political discourses can be conducted. The question which falsehoods
can be accepted and which need to be removed from public debate often touches
upon the fabric of political systems, taking into account unique aspects and
sensitivities in every country. The term “fake news” has therefore been characterized
as a floating signifier, the definition of which is subject to public discourse until one
hegemonic understanding prevails. The normative construction, i.e. the division into
acceptable and unacceptable falsehoods, thereby not only reflects political power
struggles in politics but also throws into sharp relief those issues and interests that
are considered vital for the continued existence of states, systems or societies.
Fake news laws are different from general libel, defamation, sedition or similar
laws (see also Section 66(d) of Myanmar’s Telecommunications Law) because
they establish a direct relation between a falsehood and a threat to public interests.
They constitute a very early intervention against still abstract threats as they allow
the removal of false information from public discourse before a critical mass of
misinformation may pose a threat to protected interests. How to justify these
restrictions of freedom of expression is an important question of our time.
In Southeast Asia, attempts to regulate the fake news phenomenon can be broadly
categorized, on the one hand, in cases where fake news laws are conceived at least
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also as the government’s weapon to silence critics and dissenters, and on the other
hand, cases where the discourse is lead more open-ended.
Under the first category, Malaysia springs to mind where a sweeping Anti-Fake
News Act was enacted by parliament in April this year. The law was clearly intended
to shield then-prime minister Najib Razak against any further exposure in the 1MDB
corruption scandal. The Act criminalized everyone who “knowingly creates, offers,
publishes, prints, distributes, circulates or disseminates any fake news”, whereas
fake news was defined as “any news, information, data and reports, which is or
are wholly or partly false”. The new Pakatan Harapan coalition government under
prime minister Mohamad Mahatir repealed the Act in August. The repealing law has
been blocked by the Senate, which is, however, likely to be overridden by another
vote in the House. The Malaysian case demonstrates how fake news legislation can
be abused for political purposes. On the other hand, the wind of change after the
election corrected this.
In Cambodia and Vietnam, it is expected that fake news legislation will largely
serve those in power. In Cambodia, where the government has effectively removed
all opposition, a ministerial directive has established measures against websites
publishing “fake news” that “provoke, create chaos, damage national defence and
security, incite discrimination, affect national customs and culture”. A high-ranking
ministerial representative said, “fake news is not good for real democracy, we want
good news for our people.” In Vietnam, which is ruled by the Vietnamese Communist
Party, the recently enacted Cybersecurity Law, which also criminalizes spreading
false information under specified conditions, is intended to be used against “enemy
and reactionary forces” who incite protests, riots and terrorism.
Thailand is a somewhat mixed case. The Computer Crime Act, which also contains
provisions criminalizing the distribution of false information, has been enacted in
2007. The law has then been amended in 2017 by the current military government,
which is also about to enact a sweeping cybersecurity law. Indications that, since
the 2014 coup, existing provisions have been used against political opponents
demonstrate the problematic flexibility of these laws.
Much more open-ended are the fake news discourses in Indonesia, the Philippines
and Singapore, three major democracies in Southeast Asia.
As to Indonesia, a majority-Muslim country which has long struggled with Islamic
militancy, the most important issue in politics and society is probably the peaceful
coexistence of the six constitutionally recognized religions. Recent years have
seen a sharp rise of identity politics that played religions off against each other.
A major incident occurred in 2016, when then Jakarta governor Basuki “Ahok”
Tjahaja Purnama, a Christian of Chinese descent, was accused of blasphemy
based on a doctored online video. Major Muslim rallies took place. Eventually, Ahok
was sentenced to serve two years in prison. Very recently, tens of thousands of
conservative Muslims formed a “reunion” in Jakarta, which was also attended by
Prabowo Subianto, who will face incumbent president Joko Widodo in next year’s
presidential election.
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Other fake news incidents creating public irritation and backlash could be named.
Against the background of this weaponization of religious sentiment, the Indonesian
government has launched a new cybersecurity agency at the beginning of this year
to monitor the internet for fake news. Moreover, according to a draft provision of the
revised penal code, “any person who broadcasts fake news or hoaxes resulting in
a riot or disturbance shall be punished”. The government also announced to hold
weekly “fake news briefings” for the public. In sum, the fake news discourse is very
much embedded in Indonesian identity politics.
The Philippines have been present in world news largely due to president Rodrigo
Duterte’s highly divisive drug war and the country’s withdrawal from the International
Criminal Court. Duterte has managed to secure broad parliamentary support for his
policies, and even the Philippine Supreme Court appears to play by his rules as the
ouster of Chief Justice Sereno by her colleagues has demonstrated. At the same
time, the fragile peace process in southern Mindanao, confrontations with communist
forces as well as the planned federalization of the country are important issues, too.
In this political climate, several bills to tackle fake news have been put forward. They
all invoke democracy, unity and trust in institutions as their goals.
According to the draft by Senator Villanueva, “false news or information [that] cause
or tend to cause panic, division, chaos, violence, hate or which exhibit or tend to
exhibit a propaganda to blacken or discredit one’s reputation” shall be criminalized.
A similar bill, introduced by House member Villafuerte, defines fake news as any
“misquotation or the false and/or inaccurate report of one’s statement, editing audio
or video which results in the distortion of facts and/or the context, or purely fabricated
content”. Another bill by Senator Poe aims particularly at public officials who shall be
explicitly prohibited from publishing false news or information.
The case of the Philippines shows how various political issues and power struggles
form the background of fake news legislation. Interestingly, however, populist
president Duterte himself has publicly rejected any need for legislative action in this
regard.
Recent developments in Singapore are particularly noteworthy. In September,
the parliament’s Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods published
its final report after extensive public hearings that involved professionals from
various backgrounds as well as members of the general public. The committee
recommended a multi-pronged approach consisting of improved education and
digital media literacy, better support for quality journalism, and disruption of online
falsehoods by tagging or correction mechanisms and other measures including the
removal or blocking of content or the shutting down of accounts.
As to the purposes of future Singaporean legislation, the final report focuses largely
on the protection of Singapore’s sensitive social cohesion and the harmonious and
peaceful coexistence of racial and ethnic groups. The committee also refers to
possible spill-over effects from religious conflicts in neighboring countries. Another
important theme is the protection of democracy in terms of informed voting and the
“meaningful exercise of freedom of speech”, which, however, needs to be seen
against Singapore’s very low ranking in the World Press Freedom Index. Protection
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of the trust in authorities and the country’s national sovereignty against foreign
agents and state-led disinformation campaigns are also mentioned.
In sum, the Southeast Asian region demonstrates how the debates around
fake news laws may allow a deeper look into the respective political and social
discourses. Over time, these continuous processes will result in definitions of
acceptable and unacceptable falsehoods, and they will determine which public
interests justify state intervention. The question is, however, whether, or to what
extent, the hegemonic understanding of fake news will be a tool to reaffirm national
narratives and identity and whether new lines of demarcation will be drawn. It
remains to be seen whether there will soon be acceptable and unacceptable
versions of history and whether inconvenient truths can be labeled as fake.
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